Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring
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Publication:3410917
DOI10.1239/jap/1152413726zbMath1171.91317MaRDI QIDQ3410917
Hsiao-Chi Chen, June Hsieh, Yunshyong Chow
Publication date: 16 November 2006
Published in: Journal of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1239/jap/1152413726
60K99: Special processes
60G99: Stochastic processes
91A22: Evolutionary games
60F99: Limit theorems in probability theory
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Cites Work
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