A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing

DOI10.1007/s00453-011-9602-6zbMath1262.91030arXiv1001.1901OpenAlexW2180943748MaRDI QIDQ692628

Emmanouil Pountourakis, Angelina Vidali

Publication date: 6 December 2012

Published in: Algorithmica, Algorithms – ESA 2010 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.1901

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

Cites Work

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• The Algorithmic Structure of Group Strategyproof Budget-Balanced Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency

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