CONGESTION GAMES AND POTENTIALS RECONSIDERED

DOI10.1142/S0219198999000219zbMath1045.91501OpenAlexW1957147520MaRDI QIDQ4816625

Giovanni Facchini, S. H. Tijs, P. E. M. Borm, Mark Voorneveld, Freek van Megen

Publication date: 10 September 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198999000219

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (23)

A survey of static and dynamic potential games ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games ⋮ An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey ⋮ Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property ⋮ The cutting power of preparation ⋮ On the convergence of multicast games in directed networks ⋮ Congestion games revisited ⋮ Weighted Boolean Formula Games ⋮ A universal construction generating potential games ⋮ Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium ⋮ Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games ⋮ Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games ⋮ Equilibria in bottleneck games ⋮ Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games. ⋮ Designing fast converging cost sharing methods for multicast transmissions ⋮ Selfish routing with incomplete information ⋮ A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory ⋮ Potential games with continuous player sets ⋮ An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept ⋮ Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness ⋮ Informational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion ⋮ Nash equilibria in all-optical networks ⋮ Nonspecific networking

Cites Work

• A Tiebout theorem
• Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
• Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
• Strong equilibrium in congestion games
• Potential games
• Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria

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