Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model

DOI10.2307/2951698zbMath0827.90040OpenAlexW1980877408MaRDI QIDQ4833989

Son Ku Kim

Publication date: 23 May 1995

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp608.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mean preserving spreadagency modelBlackwell's sufficiency conditionlikelihood ratio distributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (21)

The effect of better information on income inequality ⋮ Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies ⋮ Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems ⋮ Endogenous criteria for success ⋮ A dual approach to agency problems ⋮ Comparing information in general monotone decision problems ⋮ Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance ⋮ Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship ⋮ All-or-nothing payments ⋮ INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS ⋮ Information and the dispersion of posterior expectations ⋮ Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts ⋮ The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case ⋮ The informativeness principle without the first-order approach ⋮ Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations ⋮ Ranking of signals in multitask agency models ⋮ Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology ⋮ Information in tournaments under limited liability ⋮ Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard ⋮ Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions

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