NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198912500181zbMath1268.91015MaRDI QIDQ5325972

Juan Carlos Cesco

Publication date: 31 July 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic characterizationsolution conceptcore extension

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Multicoalitional solutions ⋮ Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games ⋮ Autonomous coalitions ⋮ Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games

Cites Work

• Core extensions for non-balanced TU-games
• Configuration values: Extensions of the coalitional Owen value
• An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Viable Proposals
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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