Implementation with Near-Complete Information

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00428zbMath1154.91388OpenAlexW2007425616MaRDI QIDQ5472971

Kim-Sau Chung, Jeffrey C. Ely

Publication date: 19 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00428

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (15)

Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms ⋮ Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide ⋮ Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima ⋮ Locally robust contracts for moral hazard ⋮ Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective ⋮ Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs ⋮ Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty ⋮ Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals

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