An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00343.xzbMath1121.91041OpenAlexW2022984371MaRDI QIDQ5706650

Philip J. Reny, Motty Perry

Publication date: 21 November 2005

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2005.00343.x

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium strategiesdemands

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (18)

Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values ⋮ Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation ⋮ Auction Design for the Efficient Allocation of Service Capacity Under Congestion ⋮ Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations ⋮ On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts ⋮ On efficiency of the English auction ⋮ Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions ⋮ Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions ⋮ Second best efficiency and the English auction ⋮ Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders ⋮ An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders ⋮ An ascending double auction ⋮ An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions ⋮ Multi-unit auctions with budget limits

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