Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
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Publication:6642575
DOI10.4204/EPTCS.335.17MaRDI QIDQ6642575FDOQ6642575
Eric Pacuit, Wesley H. Holliday
Publication date: 24 November 2024
Cites Work
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