A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
Summary: We consider the dynamic contract model with time inconsistency preference of principal-agent problem to study the influence of the time inconsistency preference on the optimal effort and the optimal reward mechanism. We show that when both the principal and the agent are time-consistent, the optimal effort and the optimal reward are the decreasing functions of the uncertain factor. And when the agent is time-inconsistent, the impatience of the agent has a negative impact on the optimal contract. The higher the discount rate of the agent is, the lower the efforts provided; agents tend to the timely enjoyment. In addition, when both the principal and the agent are time-inconsistent, in a special case, their impatience can offset the impact of uncertainty factor on the optimal contract, but, in turn, their impatience will affect the contract.
- A principal-agent problem in continuous time
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
- Consistency between principal and agent with differing time horizons: computing incentives under risk
- Regularity of the solution to the principal-agent problem
- An analytically solvable principal-agent model
- The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
- The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability
- Random Horizon Principal-Agent Problems
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Choice and procrastination
- Contract theory in continuous-time models
- Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
- Deterministic time-inconsistent optimal control problems -- an essentially cooperative approach
- Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
- Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3531161 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1325009 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Time inconsistent resource conservation contracts
- The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
- An analytically solvable principal-agent model
- Time-inconsistent contract theory
- Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model
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