Coalition formation and potential games
The main result of the present paper establishes an interesting connection between the (Au\-mann-Dreze generalization of the) Shapley value of cooperative games and the multiplicity problem in coalition formation non-cooperative games. More specifically, in the book of von Neumann-Morgenstern 1944 a model of coalition formation for a set \(N\) of players consists of a two-stage procedure given by: a cooperative game \(v\) with an allocation rule \(\gamma\) mapping each partition of \(N\) to an \(N\)-vector of payoffs (second stage); and a non-cooperative game (first stage) in which each player in \(N\) chooses a coalition \(T\subseteq N\) to which she wants to belong in \(v\), with a rule which determines a partition for each profile of choices, the payoff being then determined according to rule \(\gamma\). Two rules mapping coalition choices to partitions of \(N\) are considered; the more `aggregative', by which it is more difficult for a player to remain isolated, states that two players end up in the same coalition iff they choose the same coalition in the first stage. Non-cooperative games have typically multiple equilibria. A game in strategic form \((N,(X_i)\), \((\pi_i))\) is called a potential game if it admits a potential function \(P\), which is a real valued function on strategy profiles \(x\) such that \[ P(x_i,x_{-i})-P(x'_i,x_{-i})= \pi_i(x_i,x_{-i})-\pi_i(x'_i,x_{-i})\quad \forall x,i. \] Potential games are important because they have a natural equilibrium refinement, namely the potential maximizer. The remarkable result of the present paper is that the first-stage game of the coalition-formation model is a potential game if and only if the allocation rule \(\gamma\) is the Aumann-Dreze generalization of the Shapley value to games with coalition structures, which simply consists in assigning Shapley values in each subgame -- that is, partition element -- separately.
- A Shapley value representation of potential games
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Potential games
- Potential maximizers and network formation
- Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games.
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Potential, value, and coalition formation
- Coalition formation under limited communication
- A Shapley value representation of potential games
- A Shapley value representation of network potentials
- Alliances and negotiations
- Potential maximizers and network formation
- Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games.
- Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation
- The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: where we stand and ways to go
- Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure
- Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
- The cutting power of preparation
- Potentials and reduced games for share functions
- Stable governments and the semistrict core
- Coalition formation with heterogeneous agents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4172789 (Why is no real title available?)
- A generic approach to coalition formation
- The formation of adaptive coalitions
- Games of Coalition and Network Formation: A Survey
- Potential games are \textit{necessary} to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games
- Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
- COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2209533 (Why is no real title available?)
- POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
- Colonel Blotto game with coalition formation for sharing resources
- Subgame perfect coalition formation
- Stable coalition structures for transversal problems
- Potential and ``Power of a collectivity to act
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
This page was built for publication: Coalition formation and potential games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q700088)
