Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information
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Cites work
- Agreeing to disagree
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Bayesian information topologies
- Common belief and common knowledge
- Common knowledge with probability 1
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
- Robust Mechanism Design
Cited in
(5)- Decision rules revealing commonly known events
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620860 (Why is no real title available?)
- Common Knowledge and State-Dependent Equilibria
- On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
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