Condorcet efficiency of simple voting rules for large electorates

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90245-TMaRDI QIDQ2366925zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors William V. Gehrlein

Publication date 11 October 1993

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90245-t

zbMATH Keywords

Borda ruleCondorcet efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
• Single-stage election procedures for large electorates
• Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
• The effect of social homogeneity on coincidence probabilities for pairwise proportional lottery and simple majority rules

Cited in

(20)

• Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
• On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data
• On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
• On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
• Condorcet efficiency, information costs, and the performance of scoring rules
• The Copeland rule and Condorcet's principle
• Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 992411 (Why is no real title available?)
• Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
• Condorcet efficiency of constant scoring rules for large electorates
• Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
• Condorcet meets Bentham
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
• Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
• The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
• Statistical evaluation of voting rules
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach

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