Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information
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Recommendations
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
- Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
- Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure
- Optimal contracts under endogenous demand information acquisition
- Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
- Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information
- Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
- Information Asymmetry, Participation, and Long-Term Contracts
Cites work
- Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Game theory
- Learning about variable demand in the long run
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
- Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process
- Sequential screening
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
Cited in
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