On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.07.010MaRDI QIDQ844941zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser, Uday Rajan

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardmultiple agentssimple mechanismsmultiple principals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Principal-agent problem with multiple principals
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Cites work

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Cited in

(11)

• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Moral hazard and renegotiation with multiple agents
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
• Mechanism design of fashion virtual enterprise under monitoring strategy
• A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings
• Using Trembling-Hand Perfection to Alleviate the Interlinked Principal-Agent Problem
• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
• Principal-agent problem with multiple principals
• A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A MULTIFIRM MORAL-HAZARD ECONOMY WITH FINANCIAL MARKETS

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