Partially informative signaling

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2563MaRDI QIDQ1961368zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tommy Stamland

Publication date 25 April 2000

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2563

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium construction algorithmsignaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Signalling with Many Signals
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Signaling private choices

Cites work

• Competitive signalling
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

Cited in

(12)

• Fully revealing outcomes in signalling models: An example of nonexistence when the type space is unbounded
• Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information
• Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes
• D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
• Information revelation through signalling
• Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Pervasive signaling
• Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
• Signaling under double-crossing preferences: the case of discrete types
• Signaling through Bayesian persuasion
• Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

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