Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
This paper investigates perfect equilibrium in a model of a race in which two players are competing for an indivisible prize. The winner is the first player to reach the finishing line. It is shown that the behaviour of the winner of the race is often exactly as if he were the only player: the rival makes no difference. Even if competition does affect the winner's behaviour, it does so only in the first stage of the race and not thereafter. It is shown how several factors combine to determine which player will win: relative valuations of the prize, discount rates, efficiency at making progress and initial distances from the finishing line. Insofar as the model applies to patent races, it suggests that the potential competition faced by one firm in a patent race (e.g. an incumbent monopolist) may be of little or no consequence.
- Multi-battle contests
- A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
- Simultaneous signaling through investment in an \(R{\&{}}D\) game with private information
- Stability in the patent race context of Lee and Wilde
- Expenditure patterns and timing of patent protection in a competitive R \& D environment
- The three-legged race: Cooperating to compete
- Competition, innovation, and the effect of R\&D knowledge
- Budget-constrained multi-battle contests: a new perspective and analysis
- Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications
- Firms' R\&D decisions under incomplete information
- A tug-of-war team contest
- Learning and dropout in contests: an experimental approach
- Strategic investment under incomplete information
- Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
- Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
- Dynamic investment strategies and leadership in product innovation
- On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions
- Workup
- Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs
- Sabotage in dynamic tournaments
- Clock games: theory and experiments
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
- A dynamic model of patent portfolio races
- Optimal investment in development projects
- Optimal investment in research and development under uncertainty
- Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
- Designing practical and fair sequential team contests: the case of penalty shootouts
- Resource allocation in an asymmetric technology race with temporary advantages
- COMPETITION IN PRODUCT DESIGN: AN EXPERIMENT EXPLORING INNOVATION BEHAVIOR
- Researcher's dilemma
- Best-of-two contests with psychological effects
- Racing with Uncertainty
- Racing under uncertainty: boundary value problem approach
- From Custer to Thermopylae: last stand behavior in multi-stage contests
- A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
- Best-of-three all-pay auctions
- ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES
- On the efficiency of the parallel path R\&D approach: A stochastic game analysis
- Sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects
- Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
- Resource allocations in the best-of-\(k\) (\(k=2, 3\)) contests
- Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: experimental evidence
- Strategic R\& D success announcements
- Optimal selection of R\&D projects
- R\&D competition, absorptive capacity and market shares
- Evolving wars of attrition
- Momentum in contests and its underlying behavioral mechanisms
- The evolution of cooperation in patent races:Theory and experimental evidence
- A patent race in a real options setting: investment strategy, valuation, CAPM beta, and return volatility
- Asymmetric outcome in a symmetric dynamic duopoly
- Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse
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