Power at general equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1091-3MaRDI QIDQ1703361zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller

Publication date 2 March 2018

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1091-3

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibrium modelindividual powerutilitarian welfare weightutility gain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• A bargaining model in general equilibrium
• A human relations paradox
• A Tiebout theorem
• Bargaining cum voice
• Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption
• Club theory and household formation
• Clubs and the Market
• Clubs and the market: Large finite economies
• Collective decisions and competitive markets
• Competitive equilibrium with local public goods
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
• Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Equivalence of Lindahl equilibrium with participation prices and the core
• Groups and markets. General equilibrium with multi-member households
• Groups, collective decisions and markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities
• Second best taxation as a game
• Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
• Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Valuation equilibrium with clubs

Cited in

(10)

• On power margins
• A human relations paradox
• Inequality of decision-makers' power and marginal contribution
• A simple model of evolution to equilibrium between two power branches
• The power of the middleman — a theoretical analysis
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2099775 (Why is no real title available?)
• Theory of Power Matching
• Peer group effects in applied general equilibrium.
• Equilibrium in a civilized jungle
• Bargaining cum voice

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