A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
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Publication:1421928
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00050-7zbMATH Open1059.91022OpenAlexW2141338807MaRDI QIDQ1421928FDOQ1421928
Authors: Gerhard J. Woeginger 
Publication date: 3 February 2004
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00050-7
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
- Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
- Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple
Cited In (6)
- Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
- Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
- Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
- Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- The scoring rules in an endogenous election
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