A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00050-7MaRDI QIDQ1421928zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gerhard J. Woeginger

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00050-7

zbMATH Keywords

Scoring rulesRespecting majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple

Cited in

(6)

• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
• The scoring rules in an endogenous election

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