Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers

DOI10.1016/J.LAA.2019.04.027zbMATH Open1422.91039arXiv1710.05218OpenAlexW2951296410WikidataQ127965108 ScholiaQ127965108MaRDI QIDQ2321352FDOQ2321352

Ngoc Mai Tran, Bo Lin

Publication date: 29 August 2019

Published in: Linear Algebra and its Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In mechanism design, for a given type space, there may be incentive compatible outcome functions which are not affine maximizers. Using tools from linear algebra and tropical geometry, we prove that for two-player games on a discrete type space, any given outcome function can be turned into an affine maximizer through a nontrivial perturbation of the type space. Furthermore, our theorems are the strongest possible in this setup.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.05218

zbMATH Keywords

tropical geometrymechanism designRoberts' theoremtropical determinanttropical hyperplane arrangement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cited In (2)

• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions
• Tropical optimal transport and Wasserstein distances

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