Revenue management by sequential screening

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.016MaRDI QIDQ900601zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mustafa Akan, Barış Ata, James D. jun. Dana

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.016

zbMATH Keywords

price discriminationdynamic mechanism designdynamic pricingrevenue managementintertemporal price discrimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cites work

• Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
• Airline Seat Allocation with Multiple Nested Fare Classes
• Convex Analysis
• Dynamic competition with random demand and costless search: a theory of price posting
• Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
• Dynamic screening with limited commitment
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Intertemporal Price Discrimination
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
• Optimal selling scheme for heterogeneous consumers with uncertain valuations
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Revenue Management with Partially Refundable Fares
• Selling options
• Sequential screening
• The theory and practice of revenue management
• When is price discrimination profitable?

Cited in

(18)

• Reversing privatization as a screening mechanism
• Congestion-based leadtime quotation and pricing for revenue maximization with heterogeneous customers
• Optimal selling scheme for heterogeneous consumers with uncertain valuations
• Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
• Learning in nonlinear pricing with unknown utility functions
• A comparison of the merchant and agency models in the hotel industry
• Advance-purchase discounts as a price discrimination device
• Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry
• On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
• Design of incentive programs for optimal medication adherence in the presence of observable consumption
• Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
• Screening by mode of trade
• Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
• Optimal decisions for sellers considering valuation bias and strategic consumer reactions
• The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
• Sequential screening
• Dynamic mechanism design with budget-constrained buyers under limited commitment
• Screening in space: rich and poor consumers in a linear city

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