Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value
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Cites work
- A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
- A note on a class of solutions for games with externalities generalizing the Shapley value
- A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
- Axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value for games with permission structures
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games
- Externalities, potential, value and consistency
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
- Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
- N‐person games in partition function form
- On weighted Shapley values
- Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
- Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
- Sharing a river among satiable agents
- Sharing a river with downstream externalities
- Sharing a river.
- Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
- Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
- The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
- The river sharing problem: a survey
- THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
- The stochastic Shapley value for coalitional games with externalities
- The strong sequential core for two-period economies
- The weak sequential core for two-period economies
- Values of games in partition function form
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