Value allocation in two-sided markets
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Cites work
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- A survey on assignment markets
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- Impartiality, Priority, and Solidarity in the Theory of Justice
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- On reaching social consent
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- On weighted Shapley values
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- The axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes
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- The effects of competition and entry in multi-sided markets
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- The proportional Shapley value and applications
- Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games
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