Two examples of strategic equilibrium
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3749892 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
- Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
Cited in
(8)- Computational complexity of computing a quasi-proper equilibrium
- The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
- On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
- A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
- On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria
- The computational complexity of trembling hand perfection and other equilibrium refinements
- Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game
- The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games
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