Publication:1202563

DOI10.1007/BF01258276zbMATH Open0769.90005OpenAlexW2082041392MaRDI QIDQ1202563FDOQ1202563

Hans Peters, Ton Storcken, Hans van der Stel

Publication date: 14 February 1993

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01258276

zbMATH Keywords

compromise pointgeneralized location problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Algebraic aggregation theory
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Properties of consistent voting systems
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
• A class of solutions for multiperson multicriteria decision making
• Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments

Cited In (19)

• Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
• Social Choice Theory
• Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
• The impossibility of a paretian rational: a Bayesian perspective
• Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
• Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
• Locating a public good on a sphere
• On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
• Voting on multiple issues: What to put on the ballot?
• Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
• Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
• Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
• Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
• Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
• Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
• Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems

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