Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2708zbMath1016.91041OpenAlexW1972168438MaRDI QIDQ5938637

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 5 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2708

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumrepeated gamesdiscountingmarket structureprisoner-dilemmatheory of the firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy ⋮ Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information ⋮ Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations ⋮ The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games ⋮ Multimarket contact in continuous-time games ⋮ Interacting nonlinear reinforced stochastic processes: Synchronization or non-synchronization ⋮ Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion ⋮ Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact ⋮ Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ Communication and cooperation in repeated games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication
• Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion

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