Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.001zbMath1368.91031OpenAlexW2101295008MaRDI QIDQ306750

Florian Morath, Kai A. Konrad

Publication date: 1 September 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationevolutionary stabilityfinite populationtake-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

A profit surplus distribution mechanism for supply chain coordination: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis

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