Political competition between differentiated candidates

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.05.003zbMath1274.91170OpenAlexW3122543462MaRDI QIDQ380876

Mattias K. Polborn, Stefan Krasa

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2560.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

votingmultidimensional policypolitical competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (11)

Divergent platforms ⋮ Endogenous party platforms: `stochastic' membership ⋮ Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets ⋮ Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates ⋮ Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates ⋮ The binary policy model ⋮ Valence, complementarities, and political polarization ⋮ Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich-McKelvey scaling ⋮ Intensity valence ⋮ Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

Cites Work

• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
• Private polling in elections and voter welfare
• The binary policy model
• Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
• A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
• Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters
• Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
• Political Motivations
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates

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