Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3zbMath1273.91258OpenAlexW2061688005MaRDI QIDQ375021

David Besanko

Publication date: 24 October 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (14)

Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values ⋮ Analysis of a Dynamic Adverse Selection Model with Asymptotic Efficiency ⋮ Progressive participation ⋮ When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions ⋮ Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design ⋮ Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach ⋮ Dynamic revenue maximization: a continuous time approach ⋮ Dynamic screening with limited commitment ⋮ Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty ⋮ A Markovian Stackelberg game approach for computing an optimal dynamic mechanism ⋮ Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values ⋮ A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints ⋮ The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality ⋮ A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

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