Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.008zbMath1294.91025OpenAlexW3123332159MaRDI QIDQ393277

Susan Snyder, Indrajit Ray

Publication date: 16 January 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.24581.1075493308.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyrevealed preferencesubgame-perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items

Identification of payoffs in repeated games, Backwards-induction rationalizability of choice functions over an arbitrary set, The testable implications of zero-sum games, Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: Testable restrictions and identification., A utility representation theorem for general revealed preference, Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable, Every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable

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