False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3zbMath1296.91095MaRDI QIDQ403973

Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3

zbMATH Keywords

voting; mechanism design; revelation principle; anonymity; false-name-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

68M11: Internet topics

Related Items

Fair and resilient incentive tree mechanisms, Proof systems and transformation games, False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives, Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting

Cites Work

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