Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.004zbMath1242.91070WikidataQ115789745 ScholiaQ115789745MaRDI QIDQ433376

Alexander Matros

Publication date: 13 July 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/60741/1/john_dmt090306.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

decision rules; public good; imitation; best reply

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B18: Public goods

Related Items

Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets, ORDINAL GAMES

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