An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.008zbMath1242.91061OpenAlexW2055903327MaRDI QIDQ433712

Jérémy Picot, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 6 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.008

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessextreme point characterizationrandom social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (9)

The decomposition of strategy-proof random social choice functions on dichotomous domains ⋮ Decomposing random mechanisms ⋮ Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules ⋮ On the manipulability of equitable voting rules ⋮ Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Random dictatorship domains ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions

Cites Work

• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance

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