Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
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Publication:485431
DOI10.1007/s00355-014-0816-9zbMath1307.91091OpenAlexW2011233852MaRDI QIDQ485431
Publication date: 9 January 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0816-9
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