Conditions on social-preference cycles

DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9457-9zbMath1378.91077OpenAlexW1988375643MaRDI QIDQ497476

Susumu Cato

Publication date: 24 September 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9457-9

zbMATH Keywords

generalizationvoting paradoxdecisivenesssocial-preference cyclevoting mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
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• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions

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