Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
From MaRDI portal
Publication:503042
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.004zbMath1400.91207OpenAlexW2548834144MaRDI QIDQ503042
Publication date: 11 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2014/0614.pdf
strong equilibriumsubgame perfect Nash equilibriumdelegated agency gamesmixed bundling pricesmultiproduct price competition
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Reciprocal contracting
- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
- Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- A model of multiproduct price competition
- Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing.
- The package assignment model.
- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
- Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Common Agency
- Bundling as an Entry Barrier
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
This page was built for publication: Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
