Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.004zbMath1395.91038OpenAlexW3123080389MaRDI QIDQ502330

Linda Sass, Frank Riedel, Igor P. Muraviev

Publication date: 4 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2674088

zbMATH Keywords

Ellsberg gamesstrategic ambiguityKuhn's theoremmaxmin utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (7)

On stochastic independence under ambiguity ⋮ Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors ⋮ Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games ⋮ Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players ⋮ Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games ⋮ On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems ⋮ A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players

Cites Work

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