Optimal mechanisms with simple menus

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.002zbMath1395.91240arXiv1311.5966OpenAlexW2567727810MaRDI QIDQ516055

Zihe Wang, Pingzhong Tang

Publication date: 20 March 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.5966

zbMATH Keywords

optimal mechanism designmenu representation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Selling two identical objects ⋮ Selling two goods optimally ⋮ The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting ⋮ On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity ⋮ Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions

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• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
• An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms

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