Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
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Publication:518710
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.001zbMath1397.91272OpenAlexW2560667295MaRDI QIDQ518710
Publication date: 30 March 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.001
Cites Work
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- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentives in Teams
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Efficient Auctions
- An Efficient Auction
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