Implementation by mediated equilibrium
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Publication:532726
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0175-4zbMath1211.91110MaRDI QIDQ532726
Ariel D. Procaccia, Bezalel Peleg
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp463.pdf
Cites Work
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