Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games

DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0220-3zbMath1232.91034OpenAlexW2166018744MaRDI QIDQ532510

René van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan, Vitaly Pruzhansky

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0220-3

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative TU-gameMyerson valuecommunication structurepower measureposition valueHarsanyi dividend

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games ⋮ On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values ⋮ The proportional Shapley value and applications ⋮ Power surplus solutions for weighted hypergraph communication situations ⋮ The Myerson value and superfluous supports in union stable systems ⋮ Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value ⋮ Values for cooperative games with a prior unions and a communication graph based on combined effects ⋮ Marginality and the position value ⋮ Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation ⋮ The probabilistic Harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games ⋮ Outside option values for network games ⋮ The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths ⋮ Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication ⋮ Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends ⋮ Weighted component fairness for forest games ⋮ Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws ⋮ A linear proportional effort allocation rule ⋮ Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games ⋮ Cooperative Game as Non-Additive Measure ⋮ Rooted-tree solutions for tree games ⋮ Harsanyi power solutions for games on union stable systems

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