Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.008zbMath1274.91209OpenAlexW2064879509MaRDI QIDQ645636

Dan Levin, Yaron Azrieli

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.008

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitycommon valuedominance solvabilitylarge auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game

Cites Work

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• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Admissibility in Games
• Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

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