Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
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Publication:645636
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.008zbMath1274.91209OpenAlexW2064879509MaRDI QIDQ645636
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.008
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Cites Work
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- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
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