Imitation with asymmetric memory

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0554-xzbMath1276.91031OpenAlexW2146546182MaRDI QIDQ663184

Fei Shi, Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date: 14 February 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0554-x

zbMATH Keywords

learningESSmutationmemoryimitation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Cournot vs. Walras: a reappraisal through simulations ⋮ Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets ⋮ Information, interaction and memory ⋮ Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints ⋮ The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world ⋮ Cournot competition, imitation, and information networks ⋮ Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures ⋮ Local interactions under switching costs ⋮ Robust stochastic stability ⋮ Imitation in heterogeneous populations ⋮ Social coordination with locally observable types ⋮ Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability ⋮ Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk-dove game ⋮ Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity

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