Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2866zbMath1015.91009OpenAlexW2115121421MaRDI QIDQ697965

Eddie Dekel, David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200611

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityself-confirming equilibriumextensive-form gamessubjective uncertaintybehavior strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (14)

Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets ⋮ Rational play in extensive-form games ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ Belief in the opponents' future rationality ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Common belief in future and restricted past rationality ⋮ Mutually acceptable courses of action ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Sequential Equilibria

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