The veil of public ignorance

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.009zbMath1079.91016MaRDI QIDQ705834

Klaus Nehring

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric information; Bayesian aggregation; Interim Pareto efficiency; Utilitarianism; Veil of ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

Related Items

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information, Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors, Uncovering heterogeneous social effects in binary choices, Fully Bayesian aggregation, Social preference under twofold uncertainty, PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES

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