Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
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Publication:705858
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.001zbMath1093.91008OpenAlexW1979178848MaRDI QIDQ705858
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.001
Related Items (7)
The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument ⋮ A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Best response dynamics with level-\(n\) expectations in two-stage games ⋮ On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations ⋮ Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games ⋮ Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games
Cites Work
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
- From evolutionary to strategic stability.
- Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
- The simple geometry of perfect information games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
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