Beyond Moulin mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.005zbMath1168.91314OpenAlexW2078184776MaRDI QIDQ834858

Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan

Publication date: 27 August 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.005

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)

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