Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
From MaRDI portal
Publication:839608
DOI10.1007/s10058-008-0055-6zbMath1195.91052MaRDI QIDQ839608
Kristopher W. Ramsay, Mark Fey
Publication date: 2 September 2009
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0055-6
91F10: History, political science
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
- Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
- Stakeholder bargaining games
- Stakeholders in bilateral conflict
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency