Approval voting on dichotomous preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4zbMath1134.91361OpenAlexW2101334388MaRDI QIDQ866924

Marc Vorsatz

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0149-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Evaluationwise strategy-proofness, Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures, Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal, Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting, A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case, A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives, Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces, Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences, Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result, Size approval voting, Axiomatizations of Approval Voting, Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences, Social Choice Theory, Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations, Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
• Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
• Characterizing approval voting
• Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
• Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision