Invariance to representation of information
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Publication:894617
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.09.004zbMath1347.91018OpenAlexW2191255066MaRDI QIDQ894617
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/119221
Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (5)
Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games ⋮ Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability ⋮ Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games ⋮ When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? ⋮ Iterated dominance revisited
Cites Work
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- On Forward Induction
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- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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