Veto-based delegation
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Publication:936643
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004zbMath1140.91344OpenAlexW2165722851MaRDI QIDQ936643
Publication date: 19 August 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004
asymmetric informationimplementationdelegationveto powerprincipal-agent relationshipno monetary transfers
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